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S0054 · fillenbaum_1966_memory_for_gist · registry identity

Memory for Gist and Lexical Substitutions

Fillenbaum · 1966
study independent6 occurrences across 3 books · load 18

Resolution status: resolved

Memory for Gist: Some Relevant Variables
Fillenbaum · 1966 · Language and Speech · journal-article

<jats:p>Using sentences of the form: A is X, B is not X, C is X and D is not X (where X and X are antonyms) a study of gist memory was carried out concerned with evaluating two alternative proposals as to the way in which simple sentences might be remembered, viz. a " kernel " versus a " reading " hypothesis, and seeking to identify two possible variables that might modulate the gist effect, viz. the conceptual nature of the antonymy relation and the phonetic realization of this relation. With some variations in procedure the study was carried out in three separate replications which yielded mutually consistent results supporting the " reading " hypothesis, and indicating that, as expected, the gist effect was greater for contradictories than for contraries and for prefixed items (using the same root with and without negating prefix) than for unprefixed, phonetically distinct items ; the effect of these variables was interactive. The results were considerably clarified when, in addition to an a priori or dictionary specification of item type, procedures were used to provide a judgmental specification. This finding was taken to indicate the value of, and need for, such additional be

Every occurrence, grouped by book and chapter, with the claim it was linked to support and (where the extraction regenerated one) the underlying warrant.

1977 · The Philosophy of Composition
Fillenbaum's experimental results regarding 'Memory for Gist,' showing people remember meaning rather than specific language.
direct Human memory primarily stores prose information as meaning rather than as linguistic form.
ch 3 · empirical_study · poc:ch3_E23
Warrant (implicit): Experimental evidence showing that subjects forget exact phrasing while retaining concepts implies that the brain's internal architecture is optimized for semantic rather than syntactic storage.
could fail ifThe decay of surface memory in a laboratory setting does not prove that surface form is not the primary vehicle for real-time comprehension during the act of reading.
Research confirming 'memory for gist'—the cognitive tendency to remember semantic meaning while forgetting syntax.
direct Human memory prioritizes 'memory for gist' over linguistic form, which explains why people often misquote poetry even when they remember its meaning.
ch 3 · empirical_study · poc:ch3_E25
Warrant (implicit): Frequent errors in the verbal reproduction of a known text that preserve its meaning are evidence of an underlying cognitive preference for semantic content over verbatim recall.
could fail ifThe meter and rhyme of poetry provide structural constraints that may lead to 'false' gist-memories driven by aesthetic patterns rather than semantic meaning.
Recognition tests showing subjects fail to detect lexical substitutions like 'closed' for 'not open', suggesting memory stores 'gist'.
direct Discourse meaning is stored in memory in an abstract, nonlinguistic, and nonsequential form once a clause has been processed.
ch 4 · empirical_study · poc:ch4_E58
Warrant (implicit): The inability to distinguish between synonymous phrases in a recognition test implies that the brain has discarded the specific linguistic form in favor of an abstract semantic concept.
could fail ifFailure to detect synonyms may be a result of 'shallow processing' during an experiment rather than an inherent inability of the memory to store linguistic traces when the reader is motivated.
1987 · Cultural Literacy
Experiment showing subjects do not notice when a synonym is substituted in a recognition test ('The window is not closed').
direct Subjects do not notice when a synonym is substituted in a test sentence if the substitution preserves the original meaning.
ch 2 · empirical_study · cl:ch2_E6
Warrant (implicit): If a listener cannot distinguish between an original word and its synonym in a recognition task, they have stored the concept rather than the specific lexical item.
could fail ifSubjects might notice the change but consider it irrelevant to the experimental task, leading to a reporting bias rather than a memory failure.
Fillenbaum's experiment where subjects chose 'The window is open' as the sentence they heard when the original was 'The window is not closed'.
direct Linguistic inferences regarding synonyms and implications are made at the time a sentence is understood, not later during recognition or recall.
ch 2 · empirical_study · cl:ch2_E8
Warrant (implicit): Mistaking a logical implication for an explicit statement indicates that the inference was generated as a necessary part of the initial comprehension process.
could fail ifThe substitution might occur during the retrieval phase as a reconstruction of a fuzzy memory rather than during the initial encoding.
2022 · American Ethnicity
Subjects frequently misidentified 'The window is open' as the original sentence when the original was actually 'The window is not closed,' showing a preservation of gist over literal form.
direct Human long-term memory for meaning (gist) is reliable, while memory for literal wording is poor.
ch 7 · empirical_study · ae:ch7_E9
Warrant (implicit): The systematic selection of a meaning-equivalent sentence over a literal-equivalent sentence in recognition tasks proves that the cognitive system is optimized for semantic gist.
could fail ifThe 'gist' effect may be an artifact of the similarity between the target and the lure, where the lure is a more 'prototypical' way of expressing the idea than the original.

Raw book:chapter:endnote references collected during endnote backfill.

ae:7:75cl:2:5poc:3:11

As they appeared before normalization/consolidation into this source identity.

  • Fillenbaum (1966), Sachs (1967), Johnson-Laird (1970), Levelt & Kempen (1975), Brewer (1975)
  • Fillenbaum, S. (1966)
  • S. Fillenbaum (1966)
  • S. Fillenbaum, 'Memory for Gist: Some Relevant Variables,' 1966