Named criticism registry — machine-compiled 2026-08-18 and provenance-audited for the live dossiers through 2026-08-24. Dossier-linked records expose structured primary and companion sources with an explicit access/review basis. Position-card source tags describe how wording entered the registry; the source-provenance records state separately whether full text, excerpts, an abstract, a secondary treatment, or only a citation was actually reviewed. Targets are unreviewed.
alternative frameworkcurriculum theory / Bildung

White, J. (2018)

The weakness of 'powerful knowledge'
London Review of Education 16(2), 325-335 · 10.18546/LRE.16.2.11
Argues Michael Young's 'powerful knowledge' fails its own definitional test (systematic conceptual relationships) and inherits the 1960s-90s critiques of Hirst's 'forms of knowledge'; touches Hirsch only via the policy conflation with Young.
Primary targets: P19 P18
Availability: open access
Gold OA (CC-BY); UCL Press galley blocked by an Anubis bot-check. Only the DOAJ abstract was obtained, not the article body.
Registry verification: no

Positions (3)

Most school subjects Young treats as sources of 'powerful knowledge' fall short of the definitional requirement that powerful knowledge consist of systematic conceptual relationships.
“The first part of the article focuses on the definitional connection that Young makes between 'powerful knowledge' and systematic relationships between concepts. It argues that most of the school subjects that Young sees as providing 'powerful knowledge' fall short on this requirement.”
argument abstract only targets: P19
Hirsch's response — not found
none found in ten books
The definitional weakness of 'powerful knowledge' also implicates educational aims and the place of everyday (non-specialist) concepts.
“It also comments on the place of educational aims and of everyday concepts in Young's thinking.”
argument abstract only targets: P18
Hirsch's response — not found
none found in ten books
Young's 'powerful knowledge' is vulnerable to the same objections raised against Paul Hirst's 'forms of knowledge' between the 1960s and 1990s.
“The second part ... claiming that Young's position is vulnerable to many of the critiques of Hirst's notion formulated between the 1960s and the 1990s.”
argument abstract only targets: P19
Hirsch's response — not found
none found in ten books